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preference for it even increases, and the full benefit of competition can only be realized if
special distances can be overcome at low cost of transportation. Since the 1970’s, however, the
negative aspects of an intensive extension of road infrastructure has dominated the political
decision process.
The objective of this paper is to model the aspects of bottlenecks in road infrastructure, of
congestion costs and of the effect of investment in infrastructure in a computable general
equilibrium framework. A long-run “business as usual” simulation will show how congestion
and its cost will develop over time. Given the necessity to act we will raise the fuel tax to partly
finance infrastructure investment. We will then compare the cost of the addition in infrastructure
with the savings in congestion costs in order to see whether this policy measure is self-financing.
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1. Introduction
Division of labor, outsourcing in manufacturing and just-in-time production require the provision
of a good and sufficient road infrastructure system. The society is used to mobility, preference
for it even increases, and the full benefit of competition can only be realized if special distances
can be overcome at low cost of transportation. Since plans to extend infrastructure and to carry
out this decision takes time, long run forecasts of traffic and the capacity of transportation modes
are very important for an efficient economic development and for investment decisions of firms.1
Transportation infrastructure is an essential factor for location decisions and is the source of
growth and of employment opportunities.
Public opinion with respect to the benefits of road infrastructure is divided and fluctuates.
This explains that since 1960 road infrastructure for the long distance traffic has increased by
only ten percent whereas real GDP has increased by 200 percent. In the 1960’s, high priority was
given to the extension of the road network. Economic growth was seen to be correlated with
infrastructure and mobility. Since the 1970’s, however, the negative aspects of an intensive
extension of road infrastructure has dominated the political decision process. The deterioration of
the landscape in densely populated areas, air pollution, noise and global warming have slown
down  the construction of roads. The emphasis is more on the efficient use of the existing stock
of infrastructure and on appropriate criteria for evaluating the benefit of infrastructure projects.
The insufficient provision of infrastructure is meanwhile considered to be a serious
disadvantage of Germany as an economic location. 2 This assessment is underlined by estimated
costs of congestion of 100 bill. € per year3 and by waste of fuel on congested highways which
has partly offset the improvement in energy efficiency. One therefore gets the impression that
more infrastructure is necessary and, what is more important, could in principle be financed by
savings in congestion costs. In view of the 40 bill. € which the German government collects per
                                                                
1 See e.g. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1997).
2 See BGL (1999), OICA (1995).
3 Frank and Sumpf (1997).
2year in terms of fuel tax and motor vehicle tax, the bottlenecks in road traffic could be less.
However, taxation is not based on the benefit principle and revenues from taxing traffic enter the
general government budget.
The objective of this paper is to model the aspects of bottlenecks in road infrastructure, of
congestion costs and of the effect of investment in infrastructure4 in a computable general
equilibrium framework (CGE).5 A long-run “business as usual” simulation will show how
congestion and its cost will develop over time. Given the necessity to act we will raise the fuel
tax to partly finance infrastructure investment. We will then compare the cost of the addition in
infrastructure with the savings in congestion costs in order to see whether this policy measure is
self-financing. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the modification of a
standard CGE model for incorporating the impact of congestion, infrastructure provision and the
stock of transportation equipment on transportation demand, on transportation costs and on
congestion costs. In section 3 we explain the data base and section 4 presents the simulation
results. A section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Transportation and congestion costs within a CGE model
A CGE model is a system of linear and nonlinear equations that is solved to simulate market
equilibrium. It includes equations describing consumer and producer supply and demand
behavior that are derived explicitly from conditions for profit or utility maximization, as well as
market clearing conditions in product and input markets. Unlike interindustry input-output
models and other earlier economy-wide planning models, household factor income and
expenditures are linked in a theoretically appropriate manner. A common methodological feature
in CGE models is an activity analysis approach to model the exchange of commodities by
agents. For methodological and data availability reasons, activity analysis is based on the input-
output technology typically embedded in CGE models to characterize interindustry transfers.
Next, appropriate mathematical specifications of production or cost function, and of utility
functions at the level of the agents have to be chosen. The optimal demand for production factors
(producers) and for commodities (consumers) are then derived through first order conditions of
the optimum. In the case of the producer, the optimizing behavior may be respresented in the
                                                                
4 Basic models about optimal investment in infrastructure are developed by Friedlaender and Mathur (1982),
Keeler and Small (1997), Mohring and Harwitz (1962).
5 For related CGE approaches about congestion and/or investment in infrastructure see e.g. Van den Bergh and
Nijkamp (1996), De Borger and Swysen (1998), Mayeres and Proost (1997); for a CGE analysis with a
multiregional transportation analysis see Liew and Liew (1991).
3form of either the production or the cost function approach. 6 Our model is based on the cost
function approach where the supplier is setting the market price of the commodity, he is
supplying, by using the inverse supply function, i.e. price equal to marginal costs. The supplier
receives the market price of the commodity from the inverse supply function, or, equivalently,
from average cost pricing. Demand depends explicitly on prices and determines the quantity to
be supplied. Supply enters marginal cost which influence the price. Our model is built around a
flexible (price-driven technical coefficient) input-output framework and derives equilibrium
prices of commodities directly from price (or unit cost) functions. Shephard's lemma is employed
for obtaining factor demands (input coefficients). The unit cost pricing of equilibrium is
equivalent to the zero-profit condition, which corresponds to one of the two forms of expressing
Walras' law. Primary factor prices are, on the other hand, obtained through supply- demand
interaction.
As a point of departure for extensions of this basic framework of a CGE model it might
be useful to state it in mathematical terms. The structure of production of an industry j is
characterized by its cost function 1( ; ,..., , , )j j N K LC x p p p p  where pi are the prices for
intermediate inputs and pK and pL are the prices for the primary inputs capital and labor. From
price equal to marginal cost, assuming constant returns to scale, we obtain a system of N
equations for the N  unknown industry prices pi:
1 2( , ,..., ; , ) , 1,...,j j N K Lp MC p p p p p j N= = .
To make things easier for the time being, we assume the prices for the primary inputs to be
exogenously given. Next, using Shephard’s lemma, i.e. by partially differentiating the cost
function, input demand or price dependent input coefficients can be derived:
, , 1,..., 2 , 1,...,ij jij
j i
x p
a t i N j N
x p
s
æ ö
= = + =ç ÷
è ø
where the input coefficients are functions of relative prices, of the elasticity of substitution s, and
of technical change t, represented by the time symbol. The input structure of an industry
therefore depends on relative price changes, on the flexibility with respect to substitution, and on
                                                                
6 For a survey on the development of CGE modeling see Shoven and Whalley (1984), Bergman (1990) or
Conrad (1999).   
4the bias of technical change. Finally, supply of an industry must be equal to demand for the
product of this industry:
, 1,..., ,
N
i i j i
j i
x x FD i N
=
= + =å
where FDi is final demand (consumption (private and public), investment, and export). Since
intermediate demand can be replaced by  x a xi j i j j= ×( ) , this system of n equations can be solved
for the n unknown industry output levels xj. In order to obtain a basic structure of a CGE model,
the above model has been extended by markets for capital and labor, by a model of consumers’
behavior, by introducing import demand and export supply decisions, and by incorporating a
variety of taxes.
We have augmented this basic structure of a CGE model by a transportation submodul
in order to quantify the impact of infrastructure investment on congestion and its costs for the
economy. The following figure shows the impact of congestion Z on the economy.
Fig. 1 The impact of congestion Z and infrastructure KI in a CGE framework
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5Our endogenous index of congestion, Z, reduces the profitableness of firms’ transportation
capital or of the provider of transportation services. Congestion affects the cost of production,
investment decisions, and the level and structure of transportation inputs. Due to the non-
optimal provision of infrastructure with congestion as a costly consequence, firms are
compelled to keep a higher stock of transportation capital, 0KT , than required when there
would be an efficient provision of infrastructure. In the latter situation less transportation
capital is required to distribute a certain output volume within the regions.
In order to understand the modeling of the direct and indirect effect of congestion on
the economy, we first assume that the service of transportation capital is proportional to the
stock (we omit a factor of proportionality). It can be improved by a better provision of
infrastructure, KI:
(1) 0 0( , ) exp( )KT KT KT KI KT KIa= = × -
where 0a > and KI ® ¥  implies a full utilization of the stock 0KT . Our index for
congestion is
(2)
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where 1,...,k N=  are the number of firms and 1N +  represents the stock of transportation
capital used by private households.7 It is * 0 *exp( )k kKT KT KIa= × - . If 
0 0
k kKT KT= , the
initial stock of transportation capital in the base year, then *exp( ) 1Z KIa= >  from (2). We
use 0kKT  as a normalization of Z.  
0
kKT  is related to the present quality of the infrastructure,
and the daily news on congestions show that actual number of vehicles 0kKT  should be less
than the present one, 0kKT , given the bottlenecks in the provision of infrastructure. This aspect
then raises Z beyond *exp( ) 1KIa > . *KI  is an optimal provision of infrastructure, which
minimizes transportation costs in the economy subject to a financial constraint; it will be
                                                                
7 We omit private households in our presentation of the model and refer to Conrad (1997).
6determined later in this section. In the base case, *KI  is equal to the observed provision of
infrastructure.
The functional relationship in (1) reflects as a capacity utilization index
( )( ) exp 1CU KI KIa-= <  the importance of a sufficient provision of infrastructure for a full
utilization of the stocks KT o . An extended network of roads between major industrial areas
and cities and a better connection between the modes of transportation improves the
efficiency of the stock of vehicles in terms of a factor augmenting effect. This aspect holds for
any country, irrespectively whether there is congestion in terms of bottlenecks at certain times
of the day. Besides this aspect we distinguish the impact of congestion, given KT from (1). In
the model, cost will increase if there is congestion 1Z > . Since it is the objective of the
government to reduce the cost of production in the economy by minimizing the bottlenecks in
the existing road infrastructure network, it will invest in KI in order to lower the index of
congestion Z. Therefore, KI in (1) reflects the direct effect of KI on capacity utilization
whereas KI in (2) affects Z indirectly by balancing the cost-saving of less congestion for the
economy and the cost of more KI for the government in reducing present bottlenecks (see the
objective function (14) later in this section).
The effectiveness of transportation capital services is affected by congestion which we
express as:
(3) ,eKT ZeKT KT Z
e
= ×
where 
,
0eKT Ze <  is the elasticity of effective capital with respect to Z. The higher Z, the less
productive is the transportation capital. This, in turn, has an impact on the cost of production
where transportation costs are a more or less significant part of it. These transportation costs,
CT, are expressed as a short-run, variable sub-cost function
(4) 1 2 3( , , , )
eCT CT T PT PT PTKT=
where iPT  are the prices of the substitutes for transport services provided by firm-owned
trucks ( 1i = : road transportation, 2i = : water ways, 3i = : railways), T is the transportation
volume, and eKT  the quasi-fixed transportation capital input in terms of firm-owned trucks.
The benefit of having one more unit of the stock 0KT  can be calculated by the ex-post or
7shadow price of capital. It expresses the savings in the variable cost of transportation by
having one additional truck given the transportation volume T.
(5) 0 0
e
e
CT CT d KT
KT KT d KT
¶ ¶
- = - ×
¶ ¶
where      0 0 0
e e ed KT KT KT Z
d KT KT Z KT
¶ ¶ ¶
= +
¶ ¶ ¶
or,
0 0 0
e e
e e
CT CT KT CT KT Z
KT KT KT KT Z KT
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
- = - × - ×
¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶
.
0KT  raises eKT , given Z, and more eKT  reduces variable transportation cost due to
substitution of 0KT  for other transportation inputs. The second term expresses the aspect that
0KT  raises Z, Z in turn lowers effective capital eKT  and this externality reduces the savings
in variable costs. By making use of (2) and (3):
(6) 0 0 0,e
e e
e eKT Z
CT CT KT CT KT
KT KT KT KT KT
e b
¶ ¶ ¶
- = - × -
¶ ¶ ¶
.
The first partial derivative represents the positive cost saving effect of more effective capital
per unit of the stock 0KT  and the second partial derivative expresses the costs of the negative
externality “congestion” from extending the firm’s own 0KT .
We define sPKT  as the savings in variable costs without the externality:
(7) 0
e
s
e
CT KT
PKT
KT KT
¶
= - ×
¶
and netPKT  as the savings in variable costs net of the externality. Then (6) means:
(8) ( ),1 enet s KT ZPKT PKT e b= × - × .
8A unit of transportation capital is less valuable to the firm if it internalizes the contribution to
congestion.
The endogenous ex-post price of capital is usually different from the given ex-ante
price of capital due to short-run fixity of the stock. Let antePKT  be the ex-ante price of capital
which includes a motor vehicle tax and a gasoline tax. Using the envelope condition to find
the optimal capital for a given transportation volume T, i.e.
0
0min ( , , )e ante
KT
CT T KT PKT KT× + × ,
we can solve the FOC for the optimal transportation capital 0ˆKT , given infrastructure KI:
(9)
0
0
ˆ( , ( ))eante CT KT KTPKT
KT
¶ ×
= -
¶
.
The property of  0ˆKT  is that more capital is required if congestion increases
0ˆ( ( ) 0)KT Z¶ × ¶ >  and transportation capital can be saved if more infrastructure is provided
0ˆ( ( ) 0)KT KI¶ × ¶ < . Finally, input coefficients for the transportation inputs road transport,
water ways, and railways can be obtained from the cost function CT in (4) using Shephard’s
lemma.
We first want to know the optimal allocation of transportation capital in the economy
when a central government wishes to minimize total cost of transportation, given the
infrastructure:
(10)
0 0
1
0
,..., 1
min ( )
N
N
e ante
j j j j
KT KT j
CT KT PKT KT
=
é ù+ ×ë ûå .
The FOCs’ are:
(11) 00 ,
1
1,...,e
j
N
s ante sl
l l j jKT Z
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=
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9with sjPKT  as a function of 
0
jKT  as defined in (7). This system could be solved for an
optimal allocation of the stocks of transportation capital across the economy. The congestion
externality is internalized by raising cost of capital per unit of 0lKT , i.e. 
ante
lPKT , by the cost
of capital that a unit of 0lKT  adds as congestion costs to all industries in the economy. The
congestion cost term indicates the indirect effect of transportation capital 0lKT  on other
firms’ capital costs. The benefits of an unit of transportation capital in industry j in order to
reduce its variable transportation costs, sjPKT , weighted by the impact of Z on 
e
jKT ,
increases costs of transportation for industry j, depending on the size of the externality lb
caused by industry l. Under an optimal allocation, (11) implies
(12) 0 0ˆ ˆ , 1,...,s ante congl l l l lPKT KT PKT KT C l N× = + =
where conglC  are the congestion costs caused by industry l.
(13) 0
,
1
ˆ
e
j
N
cong s
l l j jKT Z
j
C PKT KTb e
=
é ù
= × ×ê ú
ë û
å .
If ,eKT Ze  is high, the congestion cost externality for the economy is high and stocks 
0ˆ
lKT  of
transportation should be reduced.
In order to reduce congestion costs, the government could invest in infrastructure. This
will reduce the ex-post shortage prices sjPKT  of capital. Instead of an optimal allocation of
the stocks as in (10) the government minimizes cost of transportation in the economy by
investing in infrastructure subject to a financial constraint.
(14)
1
min ( , ) ( )
N
e ante
j j E E jI j
CT KT PKT t KT PI Ig
=
é ù× + + × × + ×ë ûå
(15)  s.t. Es PI I t E× × = ×   and 1 1KI KI I KId- -= + - × .
10
It is I net investment in infrastructure and PI is the investment price index. We assume that
replacement of infrastructure, 1KId -× , is included as expenditure in the budget of the
government anyway. Net investment I has to be partly financed by a new tax Et  on energy E,
or by an increase of the existing fuel tax, i.e. Et t E= D × . E means fuel and is proportional to
the services of the transportation capital, i.e. E j
j
E KTg= å . The share [ ]0,1s Î  of
investment expenditure, which has to be financed by the energy tax is exogenously given. The
solution of (14) is (see Conrad (1997)):
(16)
0
,
*
( )
(1 )
s ante cong
KT I j j j l
j l
PKT PKT KT C
I
PI s
e
é ù
- +ê ú
ë û=
× +
å å
with conglC  as defined in (13). Congestion costs are now summed up over all industries since
infrastructure investment improves productivity of transportation capital across industries. If
these congestion costs are high, then more should be invested in infrastructure. If the shadow
price of capital, sPKT , is higher than the user cost of capital, more should be invested in
infrastructure to remove the bottlenecks. The more investment has to be financed by energy
taxes, the less will *I  be. The tax rate for financing *I  follows from (15):
(17)
*
*
0 *( , )E E j j
s PI I
t
KT KT KIg
× ×
=
×å
.
We have finally modeled consumer behavior by including the service flow of cars and the
purchase of cars as part of the decision to spend the income. Expenditure by the government
is exogenous, except for net investment for infrastructure, and revenue is generated by a
variety of taxes on consumption, income and profits. Foreign trade is modeled in the small
open economy framework. Foreign prices are exogenous, and demand and supply equations
in relative prices clear the trade-offs between domestic production and imports, as well as
between exports and production for the domestic market. In Fig. 2 we sketch the impact of
transport policy on the economy for a representative industry.
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Fig. 2 Interdependency of transport costs, congestion and infrastructure in our CGE
framework
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3. Data
The Social Accounting Matrix consists of an input output table, the stock of trucks and of
private cars8 and of infrastructure. The capital stock of the highway system, KI, can be found
in Verkehr in Zahlen. The number of trucks owned by manufacturing are published in the
Statistical Yearbook. The same holds for the number of trucks owned by the truck-transport
industry. The elasticities of substitution for the CES specification of the cost functions are
taken from the GEM-E3 model. We assume that all industries (except railways and water
ways) provide freight transport by themself using firm-owned trucks, and by outsourcing
transportation services by purchasing these services from rail and / or truck transport firms.
We have aggregated the 58 industries of the input-output table to 18. Industries which
remained disaggregated are road transportation, water ways, railways, mineral oil, motor
vehicle production, and construction. Based on Frank and Sumpf (1997) we assumed as initial
cost of congestion 100 billion €. Using (13), this cost figure permits to calibrate 
,eKT Z
e  which
yields 
,
0.06eKT Ze = - . For calculating the congestion index Z in (2) we assume that actual
stocks of trucks 0KT  should be less by ten percent given the actual size of infrastructure (KI
= 72 bill. €). The elasticity of Z with respect to KI, ,Z KI KI
a
e = -  is assumed to be –4 percent
which implies 13165a =  in (1). This implies Z =1.2. For private households it is assumed
that the budget share of expenditure on cars will be higher by 6¼ percent after 10 years.9
World trade, finally, grows by 3% per year.
4. Simulation results
We first calculate a business as usual case (bau) as a reference scenario by running the model
over 20 years. The figures for output x, transport costs CT and capital stock of transportation
equipment 0KT  are given in growth rates for the first decade. As an approximation they
could be divided by ten to get yearly growth rates although the model is not linear in its
variables. The first bloc of columns in Table 1 shows a yearly growth of output x between 1.4
and 2.4 percent and growth rates for transportation costs CT which are somewhat higher for
each industry due to inflation and congestion. The congestion index Z increases by 1.2 percent
                                                                
8 Source: Verkehr in Zahlen (1994).
9 This corresponds to a projection by DIW (1994).
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per year and congestion costs by 0.8 percent. This is an increase of 0.8 bill. € per year. Within
the bau-simulation run we calculate the optimal road infrastructure investment *I  and the fuel
tax rate *Ft  according to (16) and (17). Investment 
*I  is net investment to extend the capacity
of the road system and *Et  is an additional fuel tax to finance 40 percent ( 0.4)s =  of
investment expenditure. The yearly figures of *I  and *Et , calculated in the bau-run, had no
impact on the bau-results. Now we use these figures as policy instruments which enter the
equations of the model as exogenous variables. Column bloc 2 of Tab. 1 contains the results
of this tax financed extension of infrastructure. Growth in real output is slightly higher in
some industries since we have modeled a smooth policy and not a shock to the economy.
Growth is lower for railways, as expected, and also lower for road transport because the need
to outsource transportation services is reduced due to the improved efficiency of firm-owned
trucks. As shown by the KT o  column, the stock of trucks required to transport the production
volume of the economy declines due to this improvement in efficiency. The congestion index
increases now by only 1 percent per year compared to 1.2 percent in the bau-case. Congestion
costs are higher by only 0.4 percent per year which is a saving in congestion costs of 0.4 bill.
€ per year. Since *PI I×  is about 0.33 bill. € per year, the benefit of this policy outweighs the
costs by far. A percentage of 0.4s = , i.e. 0.4 0.33 0.132× =  bill. €, has been financed by the
additional fuel tax and (1 0.4) 0.33 0.198- × =  bill. € comes out of the standard government
budget. Since it is not possible to draw the savings in congestion costs into the financial
calculation of *I , a tax is required in order for the economy to benefit from a better provision
of public infrastructure. Due to the additional tax burden, costs of transportation CT are
somewhat higher compared to the bau-case, and the stock of private cars has grown less.
A measure, only weakly related to a more effective usage of infrastructure provision,
is to raise the fuel tax in order to get cars off the streets. We have simulated such a measure,
given the unchanged infrastructure of the bau-case (3rd. bloc of columns of Table 1). Growth
in Z and congC  is below the bau-case, but higher than in case 2. Private cars increase less than
in the bau-case due to the higher fuel tax. Z is still high because the industries need more
trucks to transport the production volume on the insufficient infrastructure. Finally, in a fourth
simulation, infrastructure increases along *KI  as in case 2, but the financial means come out
of the ordinary government budget.10 This policy is more effective than higher fuel taxes
                                                                
10 This is not a policy with 0s =  in (15), which would imply a higher KI according to (16).
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because the saving in congestion costs is higher and the industry requires a lower number of
trucks due to better infrastructure.
Table 1
Variable
Bau
Growth after
10 years in %
Optimal KI *
financed by a fuel
tax *Et
Growth after 10
years in %
Higher fuel tax
*
Et
Constant KI
Growth after 10
years in %
Higher KI
Constant Et
Budget deficit
Growth after 10
years in %
Z, congestion
index
congC , congestion
costs
12
8
10
4
11
7
11
5
CT     KT o     X CT     KT o     X CT     KT o     X CT     KT o     X
3   Petroleum
6   Energy int. ind.
8   Investm. goods
10 Consumption
     goods
13 Motor vehicle
14 Waterways
15 Railways
16 Road transport
17 Services
     Fuel tax Et
     Investm. (nom.)
PI I×
     Infrastruc. *KI
     Private cars
19.4   17.3   18.2
24.2   21.9   23.2
25.6   23.0   24.4
21.    18.8   19.4
25.6   23      24.6
14.5   -        14.4
19.5   -        18.1
17.8   15.8   16.4
18.3   16.2   16.8
0
0
0
7.7
19.7   14.8   18.2
24.6   19      23.3
26.1   20      24.5
21.6   16.3   19.5
26      20.1   24.7
14.6       -     14.5
19.9       -     18
18      13.2   16.1
18.8   13.8   16.8
0,01 €/year
333 mill. €/year
4
6.8
19.6   17.2   18.1
24.5   21.8   23.2
26      22.8   24.5
21.4   18.7   19.4
25.9   22.9   24.6
14.5      -      14.4
19.8      -      18
17.9   15.4   16
18.7   16.1   16.7
0,01 €/year
0
0
6.8
19.6   15      18.2
24.4   19.1   23.3
25.8   20.2   24.5
21.3   16.4   19.6
25.7   20.2   24.7
14.6             14.5
19.6             18.2
17.9   13.5   16.5
18.5   14      16.8
0
333 mill. €/year
4
7.7
( )-exp KIa (index) 0.9167 0.9195 0.9167 0.9195
Simulation results: For the business as usual case (Bau); a fuel financed extended
infrastructure ( 0.4)s = ; a higher fuel tax; an extended infrastructure.
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In Fig. 3 we have summarized our results with respect to Z and congC  by doing the simulation
over 20 years. As the figure shows, congestion costs increases more than proportional. Even
in the case of tax financed infrastructure congC  will increase. However, compared to the bau-
case, the accumulated yearly saving in congestion costs adds up to a total saving potential of
100 bill. € within 20 years. In the 20th year, by itself, congestion costs differ by 13 bill. €.
5. Summary and Conclusion
The costs of the benefit “mobility” are a collection of negative externalities like air-pollution,
noise and congestion. 11 Given the enormous cost of congestion in some European countries,
we have concentrated in this paper on measures to reduce congestion. This would also
improve the emission account of traffic because less fuel would be wasted. Although our
model could easily have been linked to all sorts of emission from traffic because it calculates
the stock of motor vehicles and fuel consumption, we have concentrated on simulating the
congestion problem. Modeling congestion and its impact on the economy is not without risk
                                                                
11 See e.g. Bickel and Friedrich (1995).
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Fig. 3: social cost of congestion over 20 yaers
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because congestion is a local phenomenon, depends on time, days and seasons,12 and its costs
could be measured in different ways.13 As congestion is easy to forecast in Germany because
it happens every weekday and everywhere, we decided to measure it as an index which affects
each driver irrespective of time and place. The cost of congestion are measured as the cost of
the substitutes for the transport services, normally carried out with firm-owned trucks but
blocked up by the congestion externality. Trucks of each industry and private cars contribute
to congestion, and the resulting inefficiency of firms’ transportation capital compel them to
spend extra money to get the output transported.
We have employed a CGE model with 18 industries and have simulated in a reference
case the output, transportation capital, transport cost and congestion and its costs over a
period of 10 years. Over these 10 periods of the business as usual (bau) case, congestion will
increase and will add up to 16 bill. € more in comparison with present congestion costs. In
order to improve the efficiency of transport capital, the government invests in infrastructure
subject to the financial restriction that  40 percent of the expenditure has to be financed by an
increase in the fuel tax. We found that potential savings in congestion costs sum up to 15.5 €
in ten years whereas investment for improving infrastructure would only cost 7.5 € in the
same stretch of time. Therefore savings in congestion costs will exceed by 50 percent the
costs of the addition in infrastructure investment. No matter where the means for
infrastructure investment come from, it is self-financing because the willingness to pay in
order to save congestion costs exceeds the cost of the investment project. We have, however,
ignored the fundamental law of  congestion by Downs (1962, 1992), which states that
congestion is constant because a better infrastructure provision will generate additional traffic.
This could be a justification for politicians to do nothing, an attitude we do not accept in view
of the waste in time, fuel and production inefficiencies.
                                                                
12 See e.g. Small (1992).
13 See e.g. Aberle (1972).
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